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Expectation enables preparation for an upcoming event and supports performance if the
anticipated situation occurs, as manifested in behavioral effects (e.g., decreased RT).
However, demonstrating coincidence between expectation and preparation is not suffi-
cient for attributing a causal role to the former. The content of explicit expectation may
simply reflect the present preparation state. We targeted this issue by experimentally
teasing apart demands for preparation and explicit expectations. Expectations often orig-
inate from our experience: we expect that events occurring with a high frequency in the
past are more likely to occur again. In addition to expectation, other task demands can
feed into action preparation. In four experiments, frequency-based expectation was pitted
against a selective response deadline. In a three-choice reaction time task, participants
responded to stimuli that appeared with varying frequency (60, 30, 10%).Trial-by-trial stim-
ulus expectations were either captured via verbal predictions or induced by visual cues.
Predictions as well as response times quickly conformed to the variation in stimulus fre-
quency. After two (of five) experimental blocks we forced participants by selective time
pressure to respond faster to a less frequent stimulus. Therefore, participants had to pre-
pare for one stimulus (medium frequency) while often explicitly expecting a different one
(high frequency). Response times for the less frequent stimulus decreased immediately,
while explicit expectations continued to indicate the (unchanged) presentation frequen-
cies. Explicit expectations were thus not just reflecting preparation. In fact, participants
responded faster when the stimulus matched the trial-wise expectations, even when task
demands discouraged their use. In conclusion, we argue that explicit expectation feeds
into preparatory processes instead of being a mere by-product.
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INTRODUCTION
“You have to expect things of yourself before you can do
them,” as stated by basketball legend Michael Jordan (http://
www.biography.com/people/michael-jordan-9358066). Expecta-
tion is elemental in many types of behavior. It allows us to predict
and prepare for an upcoming event. It can be implicit, as when we
are not aware of it, or explicit. Here we focus on explicit expecta-
tions pertaining to an upcoming stimulus. These expectations can
be either based on experienced stimulus frequency (made explicit
through verbal predictions) or based on cues providing advance
information.
Many researchers stress the role of expectation in controlling
our behavior (e.g., Kunde et al., 2007; Duthoo et al., 2012). The
quote above is just one example of how we take for granted that
expectations influence how we go about a task. However, there are
prominent findings on action control, which demonstrate that the
colloquial notion of expectations influencing preparation needs
empirical support. For instance, a recent brain imaging study by
Soon et al. (2008) found brain activity reflecting the preparation
for a free choice up to 10 s before it entered awareness (mirroring
the classic “free will” experiment by Libet et al., 1983). Conscious
intention might thus only be an epiphenomenon of preparatory
processes in the brain (but see Trevena and Miller, 2010, for oppos-
ing evidence). Similarly, when asking someone to verbalize their
expectation (about a future event that they will have to respond
to) it is unclear whether the verbalized expectation simply reflects
a preparatory state or whether it can in addition influence task
processing. According to the latter view, an explicit expectation
(which might be rooted in preparatory processes to some extent)
feeds back into task processing. For instance, preparatory processes
might be slightly stronger for one vs. another stimulus at the
moment an explicit expectation is generated. The explicit expec-
tation might feature just one of the stimuli and preparation for
this option might be amplified in a winner-takes-it-all manner,
because an explicit expectation had to be generated.
While the notion of expectation as a distinct construct has
served as an example for redundant theorizing by critics of early
cognitive psychology (e.g., Skinner, 1950) it has gained consider-
able support through cognitive modeling, where prediction error
terms are at the core of many learning models (e.g., Sutton and
Barto, 1981), as well as through the discovery of neural correlates
(e.g., Schultz et al., 1997). According to Gallistel (2005) expecta-
tions have a causal role in human behavior in many economic
theories and are the driving force of fast adaptation in animals to
changed reinforcement schedules. The concept of expectation is
discussed under various labels such as anticipation (e.g., Kunde
et al., 2007), expectancy (e.g., Perruchet et al., 2006), and predic-
tion (e.g., Sutton and Barto, 1981). Expectation encompasses both
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the act of looking forward as well as the thing looked forward to.
In the current study, we refer to expectation as the explicit ver-
bal prediction (or descriptive cue) of an upcoming stimulus in a
sequential choice task.
In the current study, we wish to put the notion that explicit
expectations have a causal role in preparation to the test. As in the
work by Soon et al. (2008) we use a broad concept of preparation,
encompassing any process, or state of the cognitive system that
promotes the (speedy and accurate) execution of a certain action.
This can take place anywhere along the cognitive processing chain,
from attentional preparation (perception) to response selection
(decision) to motor preparation (action). Faster responding has
been shown if orientation of attention is possible in advance and
facilitates perception (e.g., Posner and Petersen, 1990). On the
other hand, processes of response selection and execution also
benefit from preparation based on available advance informa-
tion (e.g., Rosenbaum and Kornblum, 1982), which then results
in faster responding. Wherever the facilitation takes place, a pre-
pared action should be executed faster (as measured by RT). Here,
we talk about match effects when comparing cases in which the
required response matches the expectation, vs. cases in which it
does not.
Expectations often originate from our experience: we expect
that events occurring with a high frequency in the past are more
likely to occur again in the future (e.g., Fitts et al., 1963). Accord-
ing to information theory (Shannon, 1948), information gain is
low if an event encountered frequently before re-occurs. On the
one hand, in this case little can be learned. On the other hand,
the occurrence of the expected event usually boosts performance,
whereas unexpected events can cause cognitive conflict and impair
performance (e.g., Bernstein and Reese, 1965; Posner and Snyder,
1975). In line with the view that explicit expectation can feed back
into action preparation, Miller and Anbar (1981) have suggested
two routes for the impact of event frequency on action prepara-
tion: directly by strengthening S-R associations and indirectly by
subjective expectations.
However, in many task situations explicit expectations and
other aspects of task preparation favor the same behavior. This
renders it difficult to demonstrate that explicit expectation is influ-
encing task processing above and beyond these other aspects. For
instance, a frequent S-R connection might be favored both by the
high strength of the S-R association as by an explicit expectation,
but it is difficult to demonstrate that the latter is actually feeding
back into preparatory processes in such a situation. Therefore, we
developed a paradigm in which participants can be made to expect
one event (by event frequency) while another task demand (severe
time constraint on a stimulus which is not the most frequent one)
at the same time requires that they are preparing for a different
event. If explicit expectations have an effect on task processing in a
situation in which one would be better off preparing for a different
event than the one expected, this would considerably strengthen
the view that explicit expectations are feeding back into prepara-
tory processes. This approach borrows its rationale from Perlman
and Tzelgov (2006) who suggested scrutinizing effects that are
not adaptive. Often, cognitive psychology builds on concepts that
lend their credibility to adverse performance effects. If the effect of
interest disturbs efficient performance, it is hard to explain it away.
In their case, the concept of implicit learning (as distinct from con-
trolled learning processes that in some cases might run in parallel)
could be considerably supported by showing that implicit learn-
ing takes place even when it hampers performance – more learning
led to worse performance. Similarly, our notion of explicit expec-
tation as a distinct source of task processing could be backed by
demonstrating dysfunctional performance effects.
In line with our perspective, a recent study by Duthoo et al.
(2012) points toward the use of expectation even when it is invalid.
We want to extend this finding. If, for example, people expect an
event they know is very unlikely to occur, are they still preparing
for it? Finding performance gains in such a case (if the unlikely
event does occur) would suggest a functional role of expectation
(being translated into preparation), despite the largely dysfunc-
tional effects. As a stronger test for the impact of explicit expec-
tation on preparation we introduced a conflicting task demand
promoting the preparation of an option different from the one
expected. Preparation in terms of “response readiness” (Rosen-
baum and Kornblum, 1982) should be susceptible to other influ-
ences besides advance information or stimulus expectation. For
example, the reinforcement of a certain response should increase
its preparation state even if expectation based on past experience
or situational cues favors a different response. Significant match
effects in this case would suggest an influence of explicit expecta-
tion even when it is maladaptive. On the other hand, following
the view of conscious intention as epiphenomenon of uncon-
scious determinants of behavior (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al.,
2008), explicit expectations in our study should change in line with
changes in preparation. If explicit expectation is merely reflecting
rather than influencing task preparation, then explicit expectation
should change when task preparation is experimentally changed.
There is evidence,however, that subjective expectations can deviate
from action preparation based on priming or associative learning
(Perruchet et al., 2006). If explicit expectation is assumed to have
a function in cognitive processing (as opposed to being a mere by-
product) it should not be altered by a task demand that selectively
manipulates preparation.
In addition to past experience, expectation can also be based
on situational cues. The distinction between these two sources of
expectation has been largely overlooked in research on expecta-
tion effects (but see Acosta, 1982). Results from our lab (Kemper
et al., 2012) point to significant differences: self-generated predic-
tions are accompanied by a distinctive expectation state visible in
the contingent negative variation of the electroencephalogram and
have a stronger effect on sensoric potentials compared to external
cues, resulting in larger behavioral effects. In order to target the
role of explicit expectations in preparation on a broad basis, we
used both types of explicit expectations in the current study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In a series of four experiments, we used a three-choice reaction
time task. Stimuli were displayed with different frequencies, with
one stimulus being presented in 60% of all trials, another one
in 30%, and the last in 10% of all trials. Participants responded
to each stimulus by pressing one of three keys. As a measure of
trial-wise subjective expectation we asked participants to verbally
predict the upcoming stimulus on each trial (Experiment 1: verbal
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predictions). To control for effects of this verbalization procedure,
we ran a variant where no predictions were required (Experiment
2: no predictions). In two additional experiments, we replaced
the self-generated predictions with external cues indicating the
upcoming stimulus. Cues were either not predictive of the subse-
quent stimulus presentation (Experiment 3: non-informative cues),
or they correctly indicated the upcoming stimulus on 80% of all
trials (Experiment 4: informative cues). In order to test for effects
of explicit expectation when it is not perfectly in line with other
demands for task preparation, we introduced a response deadline
for the medium frequency stimulus toward the second half of all
experiments.
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PREDICTIONS
Responses to the more frequent stimuli should generally be faster
because of stronger S-R associations and because they are expected
more often (Miller and Anbar, 1981). Subjective predictions (in
Experiment 1) should also reflect this frequency pattern, with
participants more often predicting the more frequent stimuli. A
common phenomenon in this context is the tendency of people
to match their predictions to the observed probabilities, result-
ing in fewer correct predictions compared to an optimal strategy
(i.e., always predict the most frequent event). This phenomenon
has been described as probability matching (e.g., Gaissmaier and
Schooler, 2008). Participants should display the same tendency in
our task if they really try to predict the upcoming stimulus. There-
fore, finding a frequency effect in explicit expectations provides a
manipulation check to ensure that participants are in fact correctly
performing the task of verbalizing their expectations in our exper-
iment. While actual stimulus presentation was unrelated to these
subjective predictions, responses should be faster after (coinciden-
tal) correct predictions if people use their predictions to prepare
for task execution.
Faster responses to correctly predicted stimuli (match effects)
would point toward a mandatory use of subjective expectation in
action preparation. Since there is no relation between participants’
predictions and the actual stimulus they have to respond to, there is
no reliable gain for them in following their predictions. This holds
in particular for predictions of the two less frequent stimuli. To
challenge the assumption of a mandatory use of explicit expecta-
tions even further, we introduced an additional task demand with
the goal of diverting preparatory processes away from the response
to the expected stimulus. After two of five experimental blocks
participants were instructed to give particularly fast responses
to occurrences of the medium frequency stimulus (30%). Slow
responses on these trials were punished by presenting an unpleas-
ant noise which acted as a negative reinforcement. This additional
task demand was therefore at odds with the pattern set up by
the stimulus frequencies. While stimulus frequency and subjective
expectations should lead to faster responses for the most frequent
stimulus, the additional task goal (avoid the unpleasant noise)
should lead to a stronger preparation for the medium frequency
stimulus. It makes preparation on the basis of frequency expec-
tations less useful because preparing for the predicted response
may result in hearing the aversive sound in some cases (i.e., when
the frequent stimulus is predicted and prepared and the medium
frequent stimulus occurs and is responded to too slowly). Still
finding match effects under these conditions would be further
evidence for the mandatory use of explicit expectation in prepar-
ing for an upcoming task. To the extent participants are able to
adjust their preparation to the requirements of the actual task one
could expect reduced expectation match effects in blocks three to
five: participants should rely less on their stimulus predictions if
the medium frequent response is reinforced.
Match effects (faster responses following correct predictions)
are in line with our idea that people use their explicit subjective
expectations in action preparation. However, there is the possibil-
ity that these expectations are simply a by-product of preparation
without functional use. In this case, participants should adjust
their predictions in line with the changes in action preparation
once the additional task demand is established. If participants in
fact prepare to respond to the medium frequency stimulus, and if
their stimulus expectations are inseparably linked to this prepa-
ration (as in “reading out” an internal preparation state deter-
mined by the strength of specific S-R associations), this should be
reflected in their prediction frequencies. In this case, match effects
might not be reduced (see above), as both preparation and predic-
tion would follow the altered task demands. If, on the other hand,
people generate expectations independently of action preparation
that is fueled by a second task demand, the frequency pattern
should remain intact in their subjective predictions.
EXPERIMENT 2: NO PREDICTIONS
In Experiment 1 verbal predictions were required before each stim-
ulus occurrence resulting in a dual-task like situation: to generate
verbal predictions and to perform the manual choice reaction task.
This could have resulted in different processing of the choice task
as compared to solely producing choice reactions. In order to verify
the results found for frequency and, particularly, the effect of selec-
tive reinforcement of the medium frequent stimulus, we repeated
the experiment without verbal predictions.
EXPERIMENT 3: NON-INFORMATIVE CUES
Expectation effects are most often investigated by using external
advance information (provided by cues, e.g., Posner and Snyder,
1975; Miller and Anbar, 1981; Mattler, 2004). It has been shown,
however, that expectations induced by cues affect performance
differently from predictions generated by participants themselves
(Kemper et al., 2012). Against this background we repeated Exper-
iment 1 and replaced verbal predictions with visual, non-verbal
cues that announced one of the three stimuli in advance before the
imperative stimulus was presented. The probability of match was
kept at approximately the same level as in the prediction exper-
iment by presenting the cues with the same frequencies as the
stimuli (10, 30, and 60%) but randomized independently of stim-
ulus presentation. The general effect of stimulus frequency should
be similar to the previous experiments, as well as the impact of the
selective response deadline. In line with previous studies (Acosta,
1982; Kemper et al., 2012) we expect a smaller match effect with
cues than with predictions.
EXPERIMENT 4: INFORMATIVE CUES
We conducted Experiment 4 for two reasons. First, the use of
non-informative cues is quite atypical for investigating expecta-
tion effects by the help of external advance information. Usually,
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cueing effects on preparation appear only with highly reliable cues
(e.g., Alpay et al., 2009; Scheibe et al., 2009). The reason for find-
ing an effect under such unfavorable conditions as in Experiment 3
might lie in feature overlap between cue and stimulus. Second, we
wanted to explore an idea that could explain the difference in effec-
tiveness between explicit expectations generated by the individual
or provided by external advance information. As the overall real
validity of predictions (Experiment 1) and cues (Experiment 3)
was comparable the difference might in fact go back to the degree
to which participants rely on their expectation, depending on its
source. One possible mechanism could be that participants weight
self-generated predictions stronger and that external information
has to be of a much higher validity to be included into controlled
action preparation, or, alternatively, predictions and cues differ in
subjective usefulness.
Therefore, in Experiment 4 we increased the probability of
match between cue and stimulus feature to 80%. Under these
conditions a much larger effect of expectation match than in
Experiment 3 should be observable. We expect comparable effects
of stimulus frequency as in the previous experiments, as well as an
effect of selectively reinforcing the medium frequent stimulus by
use of a deadline.
Participants
One hundred five undergraduate students of psychology and other
fields (74 women, mean age= 24.9 years) participated in individ-
ual sessions lasting approximately 90 min (Experiments 1 and 2)
or 60 min (Experiments 3 and 4). Participants either received par-
tial course credit or were paid 8–12 euros for their time. They
provided written informed consent, particularly to the exposure
to aversive sounds.
Design and procedure
In all of the experiments reported here, we used a three-choice
reaction time task. Three different shapes served as stimuli – star,
house, and cross – that were presented in one of three colors, red,
green, or blue. Each stimulus could be named by a monosyllabic
word in order to provide for approximately equal verbalization
times (for Experiment 1; German “Stern,” “Haus,” “Kreuz,” or
“rot,” “grün,” “blau”). Stimuli were displayed centrally on a 17′′
CRT computer monitor with a light gray background and occu-
pied approximately 2.2 cm in width and height (corresponding to
a visual angle of about 6.4˚ at a viewing distance of 60 cm). Three
keys (V, B, and N) on a standard Windows keyboard were mapped
by instruction either to the three shapes or the three colors, with
the relevant feature varying between participants. The task and
stimuli are shown in Figure 1.
Frequency of the three possible shapes or colors, respectively,
was predetermined in the stimulus set to yield three frequency
classes, frequent (60%), medium (30%), and infrequent (10%) for
the relevant stimulus feature. Occurrence of the irrelevant feature
was equally distributed and co-occurrence was balanced across
features. Half of the participants used shapes as relevant feature
for predictions and response selection and the others used color.
The irrelevant feature was not used in this task.
Participants completed five blocks of 120 trials for a total of
600 trials. The frequent stimulus occurred in 72 trials, the medium
ITI
500ms
Shape?
Verbal
predic on
2500ms
Manual response
RT
S muli
„St r!“
MatchMismatch
FIGURE 1 |Task used in Experiment 1. On each trial, participants had to
verbalize their prediction for the upcoming stimulus (in this case “star”).
After 2500 ms the stimulus appeared on screen (in this case a house,
signifying a mismatch) and participants had manually respond by pressing
one of three keys. The next trial started 500 ms after the response. For any
given participant, only one of the two stimulus features (shape, color) was
relevant throughout the task (in this case, both predictions and responses
pertained to the shape of a stimulus).
frequent in 32 trials, and the infrequent stimulus in 12 trials per
block. After the first two experimental blocks the additional task
demand was introduced. Participants were informed that their
reactions to the medium frequency stimulus (which was simply
described by its label) had to be extra fast if they wanted to avoid
the annoying sound on their headphones. This aversive auditory
stimulus, a white noise burst of about 75 dB, had been demon-
strated to participants at the beginning of the session before they
gave their consent to the procedure. The response deadline for
the medium frequency stimulus was individually determined at
the median reaction time for the frequent stimulus in the preced-
ing Block 2 and kept constant over the remaining three blocks.
If participants exceeded this deadline on any given trial with the
medium frequency stimulus, the aversive sound was immediately
presented on their headphones and ended 500 ms after their (late)
reaction.
At the end of the session participants were asked to estimate
the frequency of the relevant stimulus feature.
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PREDICTIONS
On every trial, participants were asked for their subjective expecta-
tion regarding the upcoming stimulus. According to the relevant
stimulus feature, the prompt “Farbe?” or “Form?” (German for
color or shape) were displayed on the screen. Participants then had
2500 ms to verbalize their expectation. If voice onset was registered
more than 1500 ms after the onset of the prompt, participants
were reminded to speak as soon as the prompt is shown on the
next trial. In addition, participants were randomly reminded in
10% of all trials to speak loudly and clearly. After this expectation
interval (2500 ms after the prompt onset) the stimulus was shown
and participants had to press the corresponding key on the key-
board. The following trial started 500 ms after the response. The
experimental blocks were preceded by three practice blocks of 18
trials each in which manual responses and verbal expectations were
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first trained separately and then combined. Frequency and com-
binations of relevant and irrelevant stimulus feature were equally
distributed in the practice blocks.
Verbal expectations were captured with a microphone head-
set and identified using a real-time speech recognition program
implemented in Matlab (Donkin et al., 2009). At the beginning of
the experimental session, the software was trained to the individ-
ual voice with the participant repeating the words in the response
set 10 times. This was followed immediately by an accuracy check
with 10 additional exemplars per word. If recognition accuracy
was below 95% (i.e., more than one misidentification) the original
training was restarted, otherwise the additional exemplars were
added to the pool of training exemplars and the experiment com-
menced. Recognition accuracy was tested again at the end of the
session.
EXPERIMENT 2: NO PREDICTIONS
The task was the same as in Experiment 1, with the only difference
that participants were not instructed to generate verbal predic-
tions at the beginning of each trial. Instead of the prompts used in
Experiment 1 a fixation dot was displayed for 2500 ms to keep the
timing equivalent to Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 3: NON-INFORMATIVE CUES
Again, the task was largely the same as in Experiment 1. Instead
of prompting participants to verbalize their subjective expecta-
tions on each trial symbolic cues were presented predicting the
upcoming stimulus. These cues were similar to the imperative
stimuli but only varied in the relevant feature: if a participant
had to respond to the shape of a (colored) stimulus the cues con-
sisted of black shapes, if color was the relevant feature colored
circles were used as cues. Participants did not have to verbal-
ize the cues. Cues were displayed 1000 ms after the last response
and remained visible for 1000 ms followed by a blank screen for
another 1000 ms, after which the imperative stimulus appeared.
Thus, the response-stimulus interval was the same as in the other
experiments (3000 ms) and the timing of the cues was similar to
the verbal predictions in Experiment 1. Importantly, cue presen-
tation was randomized independently and was not related to the
subsequent stimulus presentation. Therefore cues exhibited the
same low overall validity as the predictions in Experiment 1: on
only 46% of all trials was a cue followed by the corresponding
stimulus (60% for the frequent stimulus, 30% for the medium,
and 10% for the infrequent stimulus).
EXPERIMENT 4: INFORMATIVE CUES
The task was the same as in Experiment 3, except that the validity
of cues was 80% for all frequencies. Thus, in 80% of all trials a cue
was followed by the corresponding stimulus.
RESULTS
EXPERIMENT 1: VERBAL PREDICTIONS
Three participants were excluded for producing too many false
responses (>10%), another two participants were excluded
because of problems with the speech recognition software (<75%
accuracy in the post-experiment test). Data of the remaining 19
participants were analyzed. For the following analyses all trials
were recruited, including those with immediate stimulus repe-
titions. The proportion of stimulus repetitions naturally were
related to stimulus frequency, with 60% repetition trials for the
frequent stimulus, and 29 and 9% respectively for the medium
and infrequent stimuli. All results reported here remain unal-
tered if stimulus repetitions, i.e., 46% of all trials, are excluded. RT
analyses are based on correct responses only, excluding error tri-
als. The response deadline, representing the median reaction time
for the frequent stimulus in Block 2, was on average set at 424 ms
(SD= 76 ms), with individual participants ranging between 303
and 633 ms. In 28% of the trials with the reinforced stimulus,
participants passed this deadline and were consequently exposed
to the aversive sound (32% in Block 3, 24% in Block 4, 27% in
Block 5).
Our experiments, except Experiment 2 with no predictions,
included three within-subjects factors: match (testing the effective-
ness of explicit expectation), block (mirroring the effect of training
and, more importantly, of the introduction of the response dead-
line from block 2 to block 3), and frequency. A three-factorial
repeated measures ANOVA could not be run as participants did
not contribute enough data points to one of the cells (match trials
for the infrequent stimulus occurred too rarely to get reliable medi-
ans per block). Therefore, three two-way ANOVAs were run over
the response times and error rates of all experiments: one with
frequency and block to examine the general effect of selectively
reinforcing the medium frequent response, one with match and
frequency to look for a potential dependency of the size of expec-
tation effects on experienced stimulus frequency, and one with
match and block to examine the interaction of expectation and the
deadline manipulation. In the context of a Bonferroni correction
we divided the critical significance level (alpha= 0.05) by three in
order to account for repeated tests on one and the same data set.
Before the introduction of the response deadline, RTs and errors
followed stimulus frequency. The infrequent stimulus led to the
slowest and most error prone reactions and the responses to fre-
quent stimuli were the fastest and most accurate. The medium
frequency stimuli lay in between. With the response deadline, in
the last three blocks, responses to the medium frequency (rein-
forced) stimulus became faster than responses to the more frequent
stimulus, while response times for all stimuli decreased. A two-
way repeated measures ANOVA with the factors frequency and
block revealed main effects for both frequency, F(2, 36)= 81.63,
p< 0.001, and block, F(4, 72)= 82.27, p< 0.001, as well as an
interaction, F(8, 144)= 15.91, p< 0.001. Importantly, the selec-
tive speedup of responses to the medium frequent stimulus was
not achieved at the expense of a higher error rate for the frequent
stimulus (see Figure 2, top left). The same effects as in RT were
found in the error rates (all p< 0.001).
Verbal predictions already reflected the frequency differences
in the first block and approached the actual values over the course
of the experiment. Importantly, this pattern was not altered with
the introduction of the response deadline in the third block (see
Figure 3). Therefore, participants continued to expect the most
frequent stimulus most often but reacted fastest to the medium
frequency stimulus. The three different stimuli were predicted
in the order of their frequency of occurrence (most often the
most frequent stimulus, less often the medium frequent stimulus,
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FIGURE 2 | Response times and error rates for Experiments 1–4. Response
times (on the top of each panel) exhibit an effect of stimulus frequency (with
the frequent stimulus, marked by the solid line, leading to faster responses
than the medium and infrequent stimuli) in the first two blocks, as well as an
effect of the additional task goal starting in the third block (with the reinforced
medium stimulus getting faster responses). The same pattern is visible in
conditions with verbal predictions (Experiment 1) and without (Experiment 2)
and also with low and high validity non-verbal cues (Experiments 3 and 4).
and least often the rare stimulus). This rank order of predic-
tion frequencies stayed the same over the experiment, so that
prediction behavior was highly correlated over blocks (correla-
tion of ranks between successive blocks: τ= 0.74, 0.79, 0.92, and
0.83, all p< 0.001), regardless of the changed pattern in choice
performance.
Stimuli matched predictions in 42% of all trials (with a mini-
mum of 40% in Block 1 and a maximum of 44% in Block 4; 51%
matches for the frequent stimulus, 30% for the medium, and 18%
for the infrequent stimulus). Response times were shorter for tri-
als in which the stimulus matched the participant’s prediction, as
compared to mismatch trials. This match effect was visible for all
stimulus frequencies. The ANOVA with the factors match and fre-
quency revealed main effects on RT for match, F(1, 18)= 130.72,
p< 0.001, and frequency, F(2, 36)= 74.55, p< 0.001, but no inter-
action match× frequency, F(2, 36)= 2.77, ns. After introducing
the response deadline for the medium stimulus, the mean differ-
ence between match and mismatch trials declined from 110 ms in
Block 2 to 60 ms in Block 3 (see Figures 4 and 5, top left).The
ANOVA with the factors match and block revealed main effects
on RT for match, F(1, 18)= 107.63, p< 0.001, and block, F(4,
72)= 81.14, p< 0.001, as well as an interaction match× block, F(4,
72)= 30.56, p< 0.001. The same effects were found in the error
rates (all p< 0.001).
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FIGURE 3 | Predictions in Experiment 1 already reflect the varying
stimulus frequencies in the first block and approach the actual values
(60, 30, and 10%) over the course of the experiment. The additional task
goal introduced in the third block does not change this pattern.
The post hoc estimates of stimulus occurrence in percent made
by the participants also provided a good approximation of the
actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 63%, the medium
at 24%, and the infrequent stimulus at 13%.
EXPERIMENT 2: NO PREDICTIONS
One participant was excluded from analyses for producing too
many false responses (>10%). Data of the remaining 21 par-
ticipants were analyzed. The response deadline was on average
fixed to 491 ms (SD= 89 ms), with individual participants ranging
between 333 and 693 ms. On 8% of the trials with the reinforced
stimulus, participants exceeded this deadline and were conse-
quently exposed to the aversive sound (9% in Block 3, 7% in Block
4, 9% in Block 5).
The same pattern emerged as in Experiment 1: Responses were
faster and more accurate to the more frequent stimuli in the first
two experimental blocks, before the introduction of the response
deadline. With the deadline, in the last three blocks, responses
to the reinforced medium frequent stimulus became faster than
responses to the frequent stimulus, while response times for all
stimuli decreased (see Figure 2, top right). A two-way repeated
measures ANOVA on RTs with the factors frequency and block
revealed main effects of both stimulus frequency, F(2, 40)= 71.87,
p< 0.001, and block, F(4, 80)= 58.96, p< 0.001, as well as an inter-
action, F(8, 160)= 25.02, p< 0.001. The same effects were found
in the error rates (all p< 0.001).
The post hoc estimates again provided a good approximation
of the actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 64%, the
medium at 25%, and the infrequent stimulus at 11%.
EXPERIMENT 3: NON-INFORMATIVE CUES
Seven participants were excluded from analyses for producing
too many false responses (>10%). Data of the remaining 30
participants were analyzed. The response deadline was on aver-
age fixed at 502 ms (SD= 75 ms), with individual participants
ranging between 383 and 695 ms. On 8% of the trials with the
reinforced stimulus participants exceeded this deadline and were
consequently exposed to the aversive sound (9% in Block 3, 7% in
Block 4 and 5).
Similar to Experiment 2, RTs followed stimulus frequency in
Blocks 1 and 2, but the medium frequency stimulus elicited the
fastest responses when the reinforcement procedure started after
Block 2 (compare Figure 2, bottom left). A two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with frequency and block revealed main effects
on RT for frequency, F(2, 58)= 107.33, p< 0.001, and block, F(4,
116)= 71.45, p< 0.001, as well as an interaction frequency× block,
F(8, 232)= 61.28, p< 0.001. The same effects were found in the
error rates (all p< 0.001). The RT effect of cue match was clearly
present for all frequencies as well, but smaller than the effect of
expectation match in Experiment 1. The ANOVA with match and
frequency revealed main effects on RT for match, F(1, 29)= 21.57,
p< 0.001, and frequency, F(2, 58)= 80.11, p< 0.001, but no
interaction match× frequency, F(2, 58)= 0.43, ns. In the error
rates, only frequency yielded a significant effect, F(2, 58)= 16.64,
p< 0.001. After the introduction of the response deadline the
match effect was diminished from 35 ms in Block 2 to 19 ms in
Block 3 (see Figures 4 and 5, bottom left). The third ANOVA
with match and block revealed main effects on RT for match, F(1,
29)= 23.41, p< 0.001, and block, F(4, 116)= 44.47, p< 0.001, as
well as an interaction match× block, F(4, 116)= 13.74, p< 0.001.
The same effects were found in the error rates (all p< 0.01).
The post hoc estimates again provided a good approximation
of the actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 57%, the
medium at 30%, and the infrequent stimulus at 13%.
EXPERIMENT 4: INFORMATIVE CUES
Four participants were excluded from analyses for producing too
many false responses (>10%). Data of the remaining 18 partici-
pants were analyzed. The response deadline was on average fixed
to 497 ms (SD= 120 ms), with individual participants ranging
between 311 and 708 ms. On 11% of the trials with the reinforced
stimulus participants passed this deadline and were consequently
exposed to the aversive sound (13% in Block 3, 12% in Block 4,
and 9% in Block 5).
As shown in Figure 2 (bottom right), RTs followed stimulus
frequency in the first two blocks until the onset of the reinforce-
ment of the medium frequency stimulus at the beginning of Block
3 led to faster responses to this stimulus. The two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with frequency and block revealed main effects
on RT for frequency, F(2, 34)= 45.83, p< 0.001, and block, F(4,
68)= 34.74, p< 0.001, as well as an interaction frequency× block,
F(8, 136)= 22.99, p< 0.001. The same effects were found in the
error rates (all p< 0.001). RT effects of match between cue and
stimulus were much more pronounced than in the low validity
variant explored in the previous experiment and were not reduced
after the introduction of the response deadline (102 ms in Block 2,
98 ms in Block 3, see Figures 4 and 5, bottom right). Accordingly,
the ANOVA with match and block revealed main effects on RT for
match, F(1, 17)= 110.14, p< 0.001, and block, F(4, 68)= 41.30,
p< 0.001, but no interaction match× block, F(4, 68)= 0.55, ns.
The third ANOVA with match and frequency revealed main effects
on RT for match, F(1, 17)= 113.20, p< 0.001, and frequency, F(2,
www.frontiersin.org October 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 378 | 7
Umbach et al. Explicit expectation and preparation
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1 2 3 4 5
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 t
im
e
 (
m
s)
Block
Experiment 1
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1 2 3 4 5
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 t
im
e
 (
m
s)
Block
Experiment 3
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
1 2 3 4 5
R
e
sp
o
n
se
 t
im
e
 (
m
s)
Block
Experiment 4
Mismatch
Match
FIGURE 4 | Match vs. mismatch trials for Experiments 1, 3, and 4
(pooled over frequencies). Responses following correct predictions
(match) in Experiment 1 are 117 ms faster on average compared to
incorrect predictions (mismatch) in the first two blocks; after the
introduction of the selective response deadline for the medium
frequency stimulus this difference is reduced to 60 ms on average. In
Experiment 3, using invalid cues (similar to the predictions of
Experiment 1), the difference between match and mismatch trials
averages 34 ms at the beginning and is down to 17 ms with the
additional task demand. Experiment 4 shows no reduction in this
mismatch effect, with 98 ms before and 100 ms after the introduction
of the deadline on average.
34)= 76.56, p< 0.001, but no interaction match× frequency, F(2,
34)= 7.56, ns.
The post hoc estimates again provided a good approximation
of the actual frequencies, with the frequent stimulus at 56%, the
medium at 30%, and the infrequent stimulus at 14%.
DISCUSSION
In all four experiments reported here, stimulus frequencies (60,
30, 10%) were reflected in response times and error rates, with the
most frequent stimulus producing the fastest and most accurate
responses. While discussion about the role of conscious intention
in controlling behavior (Libet et al., 1983; Soon et al., 2008; Trevena
and Miller, 2010; see Introduction) might be taken to suggest that
explicit expectations merely reflect other preparatory processes
but do not influence them, our results suggest that explicit expec-
tations feed back into task processing and thus have a causal
role. We disentangled explicit expectation from other forms of
preparation by adding a secondary task demand. With instruc-
tion and a response deadline combined with an aversive sound,
participants were encouraged to prepare for a different stimu-
lus (i.e., the medium frequency stimulus) than the one they were
expecting most often (i.e., the high frequency stimulus). Explicit
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FIGURE 5 | Mismatch effect for Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (displayed
by frequency). No differences in mismatch effect between
frequencies, similar reduction (Experiment 1) or stability (Experiment 3)
with the additional task goal introduced in Block 3. Values from
infrequent stimuli are statistically unreliable because of the low number
of match trials.
expectations affected task processing even when it would have
been beneficial not to rely on them: On the one hand, effects
of expectation conflicted with the requirement to respond faster
than the response deadline on the medium frequency stimulus.
This could have largely been avoided if participants had either
not have turned verbalized expectation into task preparation or,
alternatively, would have started to explicitly expect the medium
frequency stimulus in most or all trials. On the other hand, par-
ticipants showed faster response times when their expectation
matched rather than mismatched the stimulus even in case of the
infrequent stimulus – which they sometimes expected. Such an
expectation was mostly followed by the frequent or medium fre-
quent rather than the infrequent stimulus. In principle one could
have betted on and prepared for the frequent or medium stimu-
lus, despite verbalizing an expectation for the infrequent one. A
mismatch was much more likely than a match after such a predic-
tion, yet matches were faster than mismatches. It would have been
conceivable that participants show RT benefits of expectations
matching the stimuli in case of frequent and medium frequency
stimuli and a reversal of the expectation match effect in case of
the infrequent (10%) stimuli. For instance, Notebaert et al. (2009)
have reported that in cases with a majority of error trials RTs
are prolonged after the rare correct trials rather than after error
trials, suggesting that event frequency rather than match vs. mis-
match of task demands and action can drive performance costs.
This does not seem to count for explicit expectations, however.
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Thus, neither were explicit expectations themselves chosen flex-
ibly to boost performance, nor could the aftereffects of these
expectations be flexibly regulated. The results thus suggest that
explicit expectations influence rather than merely reflect other
preparatory processes and do so rather inflexibly. Explicit expec-
tations seem to count – even when they are not adaptive to current
task demands.
In the current experiments we took two different approaches by
measuring expectations through verbal predictions and inducing
them by cues. In Experiment 1 we asked participants to verbally
predict the upcoming stimulus on each trial and then respond to
the actual stimulus by pressing the corresponding key. Verbal pre-
dictions (as a measure of subjective expectation) mirrored actual
stimulus frequencies already in the first experimental block, with
participants predicting the most frequent stimulus on a higher
proportion of trials. When the imperative stimulus matched the
prediction on a given trial, participants responded much faster
compared to trials on which the stimulus violated their prediction.
This gain was similar for all three stimulus frequencies, suggesting
that participants used their predictions to prepare the response
even if it was unlikely to be fulfilled (18% for the infrequent stim-
ulus, compared to 51% for the frequent stimulus). Introducing the
response deadline for the medium frequency stimulus reduced this
match effect from 117 to 60 ms, while predictions themselves were
not altered.
In Experiment 2 we replicated the effects of stimulus frequency
without verbal predictions, ruling out the possibility that the
response time effects found in Experiment 1 were dependent on
the second task of explicitly verbalizing stimulus expectations.
In Experiment 3 we induced explicit expectations through sym-
bolic cues. As cue presentation was not related to the subsequent
stimulus, their predictive value was as low as that of the self-
generated predictions in Experiment 1. There was a small match
effect with faster responses following correct cues (34 ms) before
the introduction of the response deadline that was diminished to a
statistically non-significant difference (17 ms) with the additional
task demand. In Experiment 4, with cues correctly predicting the
upcoming stimulus in 80% of all trials, there was a large match
effect that was not reduced by the response deadline (98 ms before,
100 ms after the manipulation). This deviates from the patterns
found in Experiments 1 and 3, where the additional task demand
(fast responses on the medium frequency stimulus to avoid the
aversive tone) led to a reduction in the match effect.
DOUBLE IMPACT OF STIMULUS FREQUENCY
In addition to explicit expectations, RT was affected by stimu-
lus frequency in all four experiments. This is in line with ear-
lier calls to integrate associative as well as an expectancy-based
accounts of action preparation. For instance, Miller and Anbar
(1981) argue that frequency effects on response time can arise
directly (through the strength of S-R associations) and indirectly
(through subjective expectancies). Asking participants to verbal-
ize their expectations (in Experiment 1) might have led to larger
RT differences between stimuli of different frequency compared to
the variants without predictions (Experiment 2) or with external
cues (Experiments 3 and 4). Frequency effects might have been
prominent on two rather than just one path in Experiment 1.
As frequency effects remained evident after the introduction of
the response deadline for the medium frequency stimulus, this is
pointing toward an automatic effect of S-R frequency and as such
toward an independent contribution of this source.
Subjective expectations measured as predictions in Experiment
1 closely mirrored the frequency pattern, a phenomenon also
known as probability matching (e.g., Gaissmaier and Schooler,
2008, see below). Thus, performance in predicting the upcoming
stimulus was also influenced by the given frequency pattern. The
participants presumably made use of their prior experience rep-
resented in associations of varying strength. However, the effect
of subjective expectation and the general effect of frequency on
performance in the choice task appear to be independent from
each other. Match effects were of similar size for all frequencies, or,
to put it differently: the general effect of frequency proved to be
the same, regardless of expectation match. This also holds for the
experiments where cues instead of predictions were used. That is,
the influence of explicit expectation on task processing appears to
be different from other effects that arise from stimulus frequencies.
PREDICTIONS: MATCHING VS. MAXIMIZING
Predictions were generated and used in a less than optimal man-
ner. Participants could have maximized their correct predictions
(in Experiment 1) by always predicting the most frequent stimulus
(which would have lead to 60% matches). Instead, they apparently
tried to reproduce the observed stimulus frequencies in their pre-
dictions (resulting in only 42% matches). This behavior is in line
with the probability matching phenomenon (e.g., Gaissmaier and
Schooler, 2008). Trials with expectations matching the stimulus
were faster than those with a mismatch. For boosting performance
in the choice reaction task it would have been favorable to choose
to predict the most frequent stimulus on all trials in the first part
of the experiment and the medium frequency stimulus once the
response deadline on this stimulus was set in place. Maximizing
has been observed in the literature on strategy change in skill
acquisition (e.g., Touron and Hertzog, 2004; Gaschler and Fren-
sch, 2007, 2009) where people tend to exclusively choose the one
of two processing strategies that is the most suitable on most of
the trials. This however, might be an exception as in many other
task contexts probability matching has proven to be a robust phe-
nomenon (see, e.g., Gallistel, 2005, for a discussion). He suggested
that probability matching is a “hard-wired” policy which is useful
in dynamic environments as it guarantees continuous sampling of
the options so that an agent does not run the risk of missing to
notice changes in which options are currently more or less reward-
ing. Our results lend further support to this “hard-wired” view, as
the influence of the probability-matched expectations appears not
to be easily adapted to more promising strategies either. However,
we do not know for certain what the goals of our participants in
optimizing their task performance are. It is possible that they tried
to find a balance between the two tasks of realistically predict-
ing stimuli while performing rapidly and correctly on the choice
task. Therefore, instructing them to increase their proportion of
matches might change the pattern of results.
CONFLICTING TASK DEMAND ATTENUATES IMPACT OF EXPECTATION
The match effects we found, with faster responses following cor-
rect predictions and valid cues, are compatible with the idea that
explicit expectation serves as a trigger for action preparation and
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thus assumes a causal role in cognitive processing. However, there
are differences in the robustness of these match effects that depend
on the source of expectation on the one hand and on its validity
on the other hand.
The additional task demand of trying to respond quickly to the
medium frequency stimulus in order to avoid hearing the unpleas-
ant sound significantly reduced the match effects in Experiments
1 and 3, but not in Experiment 4. While in Experiment 4 the
cue was highly predictive of the stimulus, explicit expectations
(Experiment 1) and cues in Experiment 3 were equally unreli-
able. Arguably, the strong associations between cue and stimulus
in Experiment 4 were still fully effective under the response dead-
line, whereas the impact of the unreliable predictions in the other
experiments could be attenuated. Importantly, the match effect
was reduced for all stimuli to a similar extent. The predictions
that could have boosted the processing of the medium frequency
stimulus with the deadline attached to it, were apparently not
spared. Rather, participants seem to have relied somewhat less on
expectations in general.
While the influence of the non-informative cues (in Experiment
3) on response time was effectively removed by the additional task
demand, subjective predictions retained a significant impact. This
suggests that self-generated predictions are mandatorily processed
and trigger action preparation even if they are obviously unreliable
and if task demands favor the preparation of a different action. As
Kunde et al. (2007) argue, expectation is an integral component
of action control. Expectations are always generated and trans-
lated into preparation (of perception or action) as this is usually
beneficial to optimize behavior in real life. Artificial external cues
do not share this processing privilege by default and have to first
prove their usefulness (reliability). When they do, however, as in
Experiment 4 (with 80% valid cues), they retain their influence in
spite of the additional task demand.
EXPECT ONE THING, PREPARE FOR ANOTHER
The selective reinforcement of the medium frequent stimulus led
to a selective speed up of responses to the reinforced stimulus.
Thus, participants in our study apparently were able to predict
one thing while at least partly preparing for another. A similar
dissociation between explicit expectation and overt behavior has
been reported before (Perruchet et al., 2006) for simple reactions
in an associative learning experiment. In the “Perruchet effect,”
response time (as a measure of automatic activation) decreases
with increasing number of repeated associations, while explicit
expectation develops in the opposite direction, increasingly favor-
ing an alternation after longer runs of repetitions (the “gambler’s
fallacy”). However, in contrast to the build-up of associative effects,
in our study the change in performance occurred immediately after
instructing the new requirement, rather than gradually. The abrupt
effect of the deadline suggests that intentional control processes
can influence the extent to which learned S-R connections impact
behavior. The ordering of RTs by stimulus frequency was imme-
diately altered. With the stimulus-specific deadline, the RT for the
medium frequency stimulus surpassed RT for the frequent stim-
ulus. In line with the intentional weighting principle proposed by
Hommel et al. (2001), intentional control might put some extra
strength on a response alternative that would have been otherwise
weak and so alter the result of the competition for response selec-
tion. Put differently, if something we have learned earlier (as, e.g.,
expecting stimuli with a given frequency) conflicts with actual task
goals (as, e.g., responding fast to a less expected stimulus), behav-
ior will always be the result of resolving this – classical – conflict
situation (see Botvinick et al., 2001). If expectations conflict with
other task demands it seems feasible to prepare for something one
is not expecting.
CONCLUSION
We have shown that explicit expectation affects preparatory
processes and thus assumes a causal role in controlling behav-
ior. This finding speaks against the notion of explicit expectation
as a mere by-product of preparation. When we ask participants for
their subjective predictions about an upcoming event they have to
respond to, they are preparing for what they say (instead of telling
us what they are preparing for).
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